Most overvalued
Ranked by the gap between the share price and our base-case fair value, widest first. The first five show the revenue path behind the valuation and the assumption that makes our view different from the market.
A model is an explicit set of assumptions, not a price target. Open any chart to inspect the drivers, change the case, and see what would make the gap close or disappear.
THIS IS AN EQUITY DCF WEARING AN ENTERPRISE ENGINE'S LABELS. The page says 'Enterprise value' and 'Net cash'; it means EQUITY VALUE and a deliberate zero, exactly as BAC, GS and JPM are built here. Six substitutions make that reading correct and all six are checked against the June quarter. (1) The verticals are Klarna's own regional revenue disclosure, which sums to reported total revenue in all ten quarters within $1m of rounding. (2) 'EBITDA margin' is the disclosed regional TRANSACTION MARGIN, already net of that region's provision for credit losses and funding costs - $105m and $63m in the US, $87m and $108m ex-US - so consumer credit is inside the margin, not hidden. (3) corporate.overheadPctRevenue of 43.13% carries the ENTIRE non-transaction cost base including $38m of share-based payments and $4m of restructuring, so the engine's EBITDA is IFRS PROFIT BEFORE TAX and not adjusted operating income. (4) capexIntensity is EXACTLY ZERO: depreciation is already deducted inside the pre-tax margin and cash capex of $8m a quarter is below depreciation of $12m, so a positive intensity would double-count. (5) corporate.taxRate is the disclosed 66.7% effective rate, which lands free cash flow on net profit. (6) netCash is a deliberate ZERO because $11.7bn of consumer deposits and $1.7bn of notes payable are FUNDING at a licensed bank, not financing; netting them against $2.7bn of cash and $2.6bn of debt securities would print a false, deeply negative equity. THE CALIBRATION GATE. Substituting the basis quarter's DISCLOSED revenue into these ratios gives…
Open the full model →GAAP-profitable for two quarters, one product line, and heavy concentration in a single named counterparty — 11% is the rate that pays for that. The 4.5x exit is power-equipment hardware at maturity; the stock trades near 16x forward revenue on the FY26 guide midpoint today.
Open the full model →A consolidated DCF with an EV/EBITDA exit, because Intel discloses no segment assets and no standalone Intel Foundry balance sheet, which rules out the sum-of-the-parts frame that a company with one profitable and one loss-making half would otherwise deserve. 10% discount rate for a capital-intensive cyclical manufacturer whose largest segment still loses money and whose balance sheet only just turned to net cash - $29.7B of cash and short-term investments against $50.5B of debt at 27 June 2026, then $22.62B of net proceeds from the August 2026 equity raise. 10x terminal EBITDA sits inside the 8-13x band this model treats as honest and above Intel's own pre-2021 trading history; no comparable multiple set has been sourced to a primary document, so the exit multiple is the number to argue with. On the base path it produces $36.62 a share against $88.24, and the whole of that gap is the multiple and the terminal margin: the market is paying about 15x the model's own 2031 EBITDA of $30.8B, today.
Open the full model →0.9x exit EV/revenue on a terminal year running roughly an 11% EBITDA margin is about 8x EBITDA, which is where a hardware assembler belongs once the AI mix is normal. Dell trades at about 1.85x its own FY2027 revenue guidance today ($309B enterprise value on $167B) and 25.9x guided non-GAAP EPS of $17.90, so 0.9x is deliberately a de-rating of more than half. The terminal business in this model is one whose AI mix is no longer growing 757% and whose gross margin has been reset to the high teens. Dell earns more than the 0.4x this site uses for SMCI for three disclosed reasons: a storage business with nine quarters of stable revenue, a commercial PC franchise printing 8.0% segment margins, and Dell Financial Services. Move this slider before any operating input - between 0.6x and 1.3x the answer moves further than every margin assumption on this page combined. The 12% discount rate sits above Vertiv's 11% for component and customer risk and below SMCI's 13% because Dell has scale, services and DFS. What the enterprise value does NOT include: $14.7B of DFS non-recourse debt, which is matched by $13,950M of financing receivables and is not Dell's leverage.
Open the full model →5.5x terminal revenue against about 7.3x trailing revenue at $181.78 today. On this model own terminal EBITDA of $998M that same multiple is 29.9x, which is far above the 18x a mature regulated exchange fetches, and it is deliberate: the revenue multiple is where the operating leverage that this model does not put in the cash flows gets paid for. Value it on 18x terminal EBITDA instead and the base case is about $57 a share rather than $82.50. The multiple, not any operating input, is the biggest single lever on the answer.
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