AAPL · Forward model

Revenue by vertical, 20 quarters out

Model as of 2026-08-27

Each segment is projected from its own operating driver, rolled up into consolidated cash flow, and discounted back to a fair value per share. The assumptions below are editable — change them and every number on this page moves with them.

Every quarter of every vertical on this page is a disclosed number. All five category lines for 2025 Q1 through 2026 Q2 were read off the 'Net sales by category' footnote of four Form 8-K exhibits, and each quarter's five lines sum EXACTLY to reported total net sales - $95,359M, $94,036M, $102,466M, $143,756M, $111,184M and $109,417M - so no history here is apportioned and no quarter is estimated. SEASONALITY. Apple is the most seasonal company tracked on this site, and three of the five lines now carry a real quarterly index instead of pretending the calendar does not exist. The factors are DERIVED, not assumed. The printed history contains two complete four-quarter windows - 2025 Q1 to 2025 Q4, and 2025 Q3 to 2026 Q2 - and each covers all four calendar quarters exactly once. Within each window a quarter's factor is its value over the window mean; the two windows are averaged per calendar quarter and normalised to average 1.0. The disagreement between the two windows is the noise floor, and a shape is only asserted where the amplitude clears it by at least 2x. iPhone [0.879, 0.837, 0.834, 1.450] clears it 5.1x, iPad [0.931, 0.894, 0.973, 1.203] clears it 4.6x, and Wearables [0.860, 0.852, 1.006, 1.282] clears it 13x. Mac does NOT: its amplitude is 0.115 against a window disagreement of 0.183, so its shape is launch timing, not a calendar, and it is left aseasonal. Services does not either: its amplitude is 0.044 against a disagreement of 0.084, entirely inside the noise, which is what a subscription and commission annuity looks like. Two consequences a reader must hold. First, on the three seasonal lines growthQoQ is a DESEASONALISED TREND rate, not a printed sequential step - the engine strips the basis quarter's factor before the driver runs and reapplies the projected quarter's factor afterwards. Second, the December quarter is now modelled rather than lost: the first projected December prints $162.1B against $143,756M actually printed in December 2025, +12.8%, where the previous build of this page printed $116.1B, a 19% holiday-quarter decline one quarter after Apple guided +10%. THE SEPTEMBER GUIDE. Apple guided total revenue (9-11%), iPhone (mid-teens) and Services, and nothing else. iPhone is taken at 15% on $49,025M, giving $56,379M. Services is the correction that matters most: the CFO said the September reported growth rate would be largely similar to the June quarter's AFTER REMOVING the negative sequential impact of about two and a half percentage points from foreign exchange, so the rate that will be PRINTED is about 12.1% - 2.5 = 9.6%, not 12.1%. That is $28,750M x 1.096 = $31,510M. The remaining $24,824M for Mac, iPad and Wearables is the guided midpoint less those two lines; it is split with Mac carrying the largest share of the shortfall, because Mac just printed a record on a launch and is the line for which advanced-node constraints were named. That split is ours and is stated as such. The five lines sum to $112,776M against the $112,713M guidance midpoint, +0.06%, and +10.1% year over year against the guided 9-11%. WHAT THE PATH RECONCILES TO. Fiscal 2027 for Apple is the December 2026, March 2027, June 2027 and September 2027 quarters, and this model projects $520.9B of revenue across them against a sell-side consensus of about $525.00B - 0.8% below. The gap is not tuned away and it is where the model disagrees: it decays iPhone's deseasonalised trend from +4.3% a quarter toward +0.7% and holds Services at a decelerating low-double-digit rate, so it grows fiscal 2027 by 9.2% on a fiscal 2026 that lands at $477.1B (three printed quarters plus the guided September). Consensus needs roughly one further point of annual growth than the drivers here produce. WHAT IS ASSUMED. Apple discloses cost of sales for Products and Services only, never by category, so the four hardware verticals all carry one identical margin: the disclosed 40.07% Products gross margin plus a uniform 3.0-point revenue share of company D&A, 43.1%. Services carries its own disclosed 75.62% plus the same add-back, 78.7%. That is the largest simplification on the page and it means iPad and iPhone are indistinguishable at the margin line, which they certainly are not in reality. Corporate overhead is the disclosed 17.4% of revenue (total operating expenses $19,075M on $109,417M), carried at company level because Apple reports R&D and SG&A only in total. The check that this reconciles: 43.1% on $78,678M of Products plus 78.7% on $30,739M of Services less 17.4% of $109,417M gives $39.1B against the actual $39.0B of operating income plus D&A - within 0.2%. THE TAX RATE IS AN ASSUMPTION, NOT THE GUIDE. Apple guided a 16.5% tax rate for the September quarter and for that quarter only; the June quarter's actual effective rate was 17.86% ($6,478M of provision on $36,267M of pre-tax income). Carrying a one-quarter guide unchanged across twenty quarters would be a category error, so this page carries 17.5% - between the one-quarter guide and the last printed effective rate, closer to the printed rate - and labels it an assumption. Note also that the engine taxes (EBITDA less capex), a cash-flow proxy rather than GAAP pre-tax income, so this rate is a convention shared with every other model on the site and not a forecast of Apple's provision. SHARES. The 14,608,963 thousand shares used for the per-share arithmetic are the basic shares issued and outstanding at 27 June 2026 as printed on the balance sheet, NOT a diluted weighted average; the diluted weighted-average count that quarter was 14,714,676 thousand, 0.7% higher. Using the point-in-time outstanding count is the right choice for an enterprise-value bridge struck at a moment, and the valuation table on this page no longer mislabels it. No share repurchase is modelled into the count: the $100B authorisation and $62,094M of nine-month repurchases are real and are the reason EPS grows faster than net income, but this is an enterprise free-cash-flow model and per-share accretion from a shrinking count is not projected. Capital programmes are empty for the same reason - Apple's shareholder returns are financing, not capital spending outside the verticals. THREE THINGS THIS MODEL DELIBERATELY DOES NOT DO. It builds no iPhone unit or ASP series, because Apple has published neither since fiscal 2018. It builds no Services subscriber series: the 2.5 billion active devices and 1.5 billion paid subscriptions are floors Apple repeats, so they appear as context and as a $12.30-per-device-per-quarter ceiling check, never as a driver. And it splits no Services sub-line, because Apple publishes none. ON THE VALUATION. 8x terminal revenue against 9.6x trailing today. On the 34.9% terminal EBITDA margin this projection reaches after corporate overhead, 8x revenue is about 23x EBITDA, which sits on the 22x the research brief assumed independently and against 26.6x trailing today - the two assumptions agree, which is the point of stating both. Alphabet's model here exits at 6.5x and Microsoft's at 7x, but neither has a 28%-of-revenue, 75%-margin services annuity bolted to a hardware franchise, so the exit is set as a fade from Apple's own multiple rather than borrowed from a comp. TWO THINGS TO HOLD AGAINST THE PAGE. Apple files no guidance: every September figure above exists only in the 30 July 2026 earnings call, which Apple publishes as audio only, and was taken from two independent transcript renderings that agree verbatim on the numbers. And inventories nearly doubled to $11,092M while intangible assets, net rose to $20,342M since September 2025, neither moving with revenue and neither explained in the exhibit - if that inventory is memory pre-buying it supports the guided cost pressure, and if it is a demand miss it undercuts the guide. Tim Cook hands the CEO role to John Ternus on 1 September 2026, one day before the September quarter closes; no driver here is adjusted for it, but the first guide from a new CEO is a discontinuity in how conservative the guidance convention may be. Finally, the seasonal index itself rests on six printed quarters: the March and June factors are each observed twice, the September and December factors only once, so the holiday factor in particular is a one-year read and should be revisited when the September 2026 quarter prints.

Where each case comes from

From cash flow to fair value

The projected path

Every row is projected. A year-over-year change is shown only where the quarter it compares against exists — an em dash means there is no comparable quarter, not a flat year.

Model revisions

Assumptions are marked to reality as each quarter prints. Every change is appended here, with the fair value the model produced at the time, so the model's own history stays visible.