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SPCX · Forward model · Space · Bear case

What has to happen in Space

Model as of

This page changes Space inside the complete SPCX model. Every other vertical, corporate programme and valuation assumption stays in the selected portfolio case.

SPCX forward model
Horizon
Consolidated fair value $39.25 all other verticals held in this portfolio case
Final-quarter revenue $936M 3% of company revenue
Explicit segment contribution −$6.20B EBITDA less segment capex, before corporate items

ARPU pressure from emerging markets and Kuiper, AI contracts slip or utilisation lags, Starship delays keep Space loss-making and constrain constellation growth. Capex stays extreme. Origin fails to pull repositories off GitHub and Cursor seats churn back to bundled Copilot as model quality converges, leaving a $60B acquisition earning editor money — the line ends 2031 below where Cursor is running today. The Model layer never gets going: Grok holds about 6% of a pool growing 3% a quarter, which is the share the argument for this line was supposed to make irrelevant.

Space

Basis quarter$960M
Final quarter$936M
Implied CAGR−1%
Final revenue mix3%

External commercial and government launch plus Dragon crew/cargo and Starship development milestones. A cost centre with strategic optionality: it subsidises the other two segments at internal cost and only approaches break-even as Starship reusability lands.

Last four quarters
2025 Q3 $950M Estimated
2025 Q4 $900M Estimated
2026 Q1 $450M Estimated
2026 Q2 $960M Reported
External Falcon 9 / Heavy launchesDragon crew and cargoStarship development milestones (HLS)
Units 15/qtr growing +4.0% per quarter 15 external flights a quarter. Internal Starlink launches are a cost, not segment revenue.
Price per unit $64M drifting −1.0% per quarter $64M average across commercial, government and Dragon, from $960M of Q2 revenue over the flight count.
Space

Latest: $936M (2031Q2E)

Period Value
2025Q1 $1.20B
2025Q2 $1.05B
2025Q3 $950M
2025Q4 $900M
2026Q1 $450M
2026Q2 $960M
2026Q3E $959M
2026Q4E $958M
2027Q1E $956M
2027Q2E $955M
2027Q3E $954M
2027Q4E $953M
2028Q1E $951M
2028Q2E $950M
2028Q3E $949M
2028Q4E $948M
2029Q1E $946M
2029Q2E $945M
2029Q3E $944M
2029Q4E $943M
2030Q1E $942M
2030Q2E $940M
2030Q3E $939M
2030Q4E $938M
2031Q1E $937M
2031Q2E $936M

Assumptions & reasoning

  • Only external customers are counted. Internal Starlink launches are by far the larger share of flights but are an internal cost transfer, not revenue — treating them as revenue would double-count the constellation the Connectivity segment already pays for.
  • Modelled on flights x price because both move independently and in opposite directions: Starship adds cadence while reusability lowers what the market will pay per kilogram. A revenue growth rate would collapse two opposing forces into one number.
  • Margin starts deeply negative at -35% and glides only to 8% by the end of the horizon. Starship development is expensed here while its benefit accrues to Connectivity, so this segment carries cost for value that shows up in another line.
  • This is the segment where the model is least sensitive and least confident. It is roughly 5% of revenue by the final quarter, so even a large error barely moves the fair value — but a Starship schedule slip would also slow the constellation, and that does move it.
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