SPCX · Forward model · Starlink Mobile · Bear case
What has to happen in Starlink Mobile
Model as of
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Starlink Mobile
Basis quarter$0
Final quarter$835M
Final revenue mix3%
The enhanced direct-to-handset service, not the messaging bolt-on that exists today. It needs the V2 Mobile satellites - ~50 per Starship flight, roughly 100x the data density - and the EchoStar spectrum before there is enough capacity to sell rather than to bundle. That makes it a 2028 business with a 2026 announcement, and the gap is the whole risk.
Last four quarters
2025 Q3
$0
Estimated
2025 Q4
$0
Estimated
2026 Q1
$0
Estimated
2026 Q2
$0
Reported
MNO wholesale revenue share on the enhanced tierPaid voice and data plans in partner marketsDirect retail on EchoStar spectrum (optional, unmodelled)
Subscribers
100K
0.0% of a 900.0M addressable base
100K on the early direct-to-cell tier. This is a handset base, so its ceiling is a different order.
Addressable subscribers
900.0M
the S-curve ceiling
900M handsets on partner carriers in markets with real coverage gaps — devices, not households.
Net adds
1.0M/qtr
ramping toward 9.0M/qtr, throttled as the base approaches the TAM
1M a quarter at launch. Carrier partnerships, not satellite capacity, gate the early ramp.
Net-add ceiling
9.0M/qtr
what supply can deliver at full rate
9M a quarter once the partner base is live. Adds ramp toward this rather than compounding at 12%.
ARPU
$6.00/mo
drifting +1.0% per quarter, floor $0.00
$6 a month: above the light tier, far below the $66 dish ARPU. Still a wholesale slice, not a retail price.
Non-subscriber revenue
$0/qtr
growing 0.0% per quarter
Zero. Any direct retail on EchoStar spectrum would land here; none is modelled.
Starlink Mobile
Latest: $835M (2031Q2E)
| Period | Value |
|---|---|
| 2025Q1 | $0.00 |
| 2025Q2 | $0.00 |
| 2025Q3 | $0.00 |
| 2025Q4 | $0.00 |
| 2026Q1 | $0.00 |
| 2026Q2 | $0.00 |
| 2026Q3E | $0.00 |
| 2026Q4E | $0.00 |
| 2027Q1E | $0.00 |
| 2027Q2E | $0.00 |
| 2027Q3E | $0.00 |
| 2027Q4E | $0.00 |
| 2028Q1E | $30M |
| 2028Q2E | $70M |
| 2028Q3E | $118M |
| 2028Q4E | $173M |
| 2029Q1E | $234M |
| 2029Q2E | $298M |
| 2029Q3E | $364M |
| 2029Q4E | $432M |
| 2030Q1E | $501M |
| 2030Q2E | $570M |
| 2030Q3E | $638M |
| 2030Q4E | $705M |
| 2031Q1E | $771M |
| 2031Q2E | $835M |
Assumptions & reasoning
- Modelled on monetised users x wholesale ARPU because the economics are a revenue share, not a price SpaceX sets. Growth comes from carriers signing, not from users churning in and out.
- Zero revenue for six quarters is the point of this vertical. The light service already earns money and is counted in Starlink; what is modelled here is only the step-change the V2 satellites and the EchoStar spectrum unlock, and none of it can be sold before end-2027.
- Margin glides 40% to 68% - higher than the dish business, because the incremental cost of a direct-to-cell user is close to zero once the satellites are up. Capex intensity starts at 140% while the dedicated V2 fleet is built and falls to 25%.
- Reaching roughly 70M monetised users by 2031 sounds aggressive against ~22M light actives today, but the constraint is carrier packaging rather than coverage, and coverage is already near-global. The load-bearing assumption is ARPU: at $3 rather than $6 this vertical is worth half, and the carriers set that number, not SpaceX.