UBER · Forward model · Dara case

The Dara case, 20 quarters out

Each segment is projected from its own operating driver, rolled up into consolidated cash flow, and discounted back to a fair value per share. The assumptions below are editable — change them and every number on this page moves with them.

Uber's disclosure carries this model further than most. Every quarter it publishes, per segment, Gross Bookings, revenue, and Segment Operating Income - plus a single Corporate G&A and Platform R&D line it explicitly does not attribute to any segment. So the volume driver, the take rate and the segment margin are all reported figures here, nothing is apportioned, and the corporate overhead percentage is Uber's own number rather than an assumption. Each vertical is built the way Uber itself frames the business: units are Gross Bookings in millions of dollars, and price per unit is revenue per $1M of bookings, which is Revenue Margin as the company defines it. Two cautions on the reported figures. Mobility's revenue margin fell from 29.90% to 25.40% between the December and March quarters because a business-model change moved several markets to net revenue recognition; the company says it cut total revenue growth by 8 percentage points with no effect on bookings or profit, so Uber's revenue is simply a smaller number than it used to be for the same business, and every EV/revenue multiple - including this model's exit multiple - is mechanically higher because of it. And what this model labels EBITDA is Segment Operating Income less the corporate line, which reproduces Uber's Non-GAAP Operating Income exactly ($2,143M in the June quarter), not its Adjusted EBITDA of $2,819M. Read the exit multiple against operating income, not against EBITDA. Autonomy is deliberately not a vertical. Uber discloses no AV revenue, and an autonomous trip that replaces a human one already sits inside Mobility's reported Gross Bookings, so a separate line would count the same trip twice. AV therefore appears only where it can honestly appear: in Mobility's margin glide, and in the scenarios. Uber's stated multi-year commitment of more than $10bn to autonomy is press-reported without a schedule and is booked nowhere here - about $4.80 a share at face value. Delivery Hero is not owned. It carries zero across every historical quarter and starts five quarters out, the second half of 2027 the company guided to, on the 50 markets and $42bn of 2025 bookings Uber actually acquires - not the 14 markets going to SSW Partners. Net cash is already reduced by the $13.7bn consideration, so switching that vertical off would leave the valuation paying for something it never bought; Delivery Hero's own debt is not disclosed and is not modelled. Share count is held flat although Uber is reducing it, which understates every case. Read the fair value the other way round. At an exit of 3.5x terminal revenue - itself a mild de-rate on operating income against today - the base case is $137.73. The 20 August price of $78.55 requires 1.87x. The published sell-side target zone of roughly $101-113 requires 2.49x to 2.82x. Every one of those, the market price included, needs the multiple to compress from where it is now. The disagreement about Uber is not about growth; on these drivers the 2027 revenue line lands on consensus. It is entirely about what the multiple should be in 2031.

Where each case comes from

From cash flow to fair value

The projected path

Every row is projected. A year-over-year change is shown only where the quarter it compares against exists — an em dash means there is no comparable quarter, not a flat year.

Model revisions

Assumptions are marked to reality as each quarter prints. Every change is appended here, with the fair value the model produced at the time, so the model's own history stays visible.