GRAB · Forward model · Oey 2028 case

The Oey 2028 case, 20 quarters out

Model as of 2026-08-27

Each segment is projected from its own operating driver, rolled up into consolidated cash flow, and discounted back to a fair value per share. The assumptions below are editable — change them and every number on this page moves with them.

Grab's segment disclosure carries this model further than most. Every quarter it publishes Deliveries, Mobility, Financial Services and Others revenue, and those four lines sum to consolidated revenue with zero residual in each of the six quarters from 2025 Q1 to 2026 Q2 - no segment here is derived by subtraction, and no split has been invented. Deliveries and Mobility also publish GMV and Segment Adjusted EBITDA, so both On-Demand verticals run on a disclosed volume times a disclosed monetisation rate: units are millions of dollars of GMV and price per unit is revenue per $1m of GMV. Financial Services cannot be modelled that way. Its perimeter changed twice inside the window - Superbank consolidated in June 2026, Stash from Q3 2026 - the loan-portfolio metric switched from net to gross between the Q3 2025 and Q1 2026 releases, and revenue per dollar of loan book fell from 12.0% to 5.8% as the book outgrew the revenue. It gets a growth driver with the $2,318m book recorded as an observation. What this model calls EBITDA is Grab's Adjusted EBITDA exactly: the four Segment Adjusted EBITDA lines less the single unallocated regional corporate cost line, which reproduces the reported $168m in the June quarter ($96m + $191m - $15m - $0m - $104m). Read the exit multiple against that, and read it knowing Adjusted EBITDA adds back $62m of quarterly share-based compensation - roughly $250m a year of real dilution this model never charges, on a share count held flat even though Grab is buying stock back. Two further boundaries. Net cash is $2,887m, not the company-defined $5.4bn of net cash liquidity: $2,513m of that funds bank customer deposits, which are a liability to depositors rather than shareholder cash, and using the company figure would add about $0.62 a share. Capex is the broader $49m from the Adjusted Free Cash Flow reconciliation, not the $28m of property and intangibles in the cash flow statement, and Grab publishes no capex by segment, so the group rate of 4.9% of revenue is applied to the three real verticals and none to Others. foodpanda Taiwan appears only as a $600m cash outflow in 2026 Q4: the price is disclosed and the revenue is not, so it must not become a vertical. Autonomous vehicles are already inside Mobility GMV and get no line either. And the reported profit is not an operating result - $235m of it is $19m of operating profit plus $171m of net finance income containing a one-time $307m Superbank remeasurement gain and a $43m tax credit - which is why the exit is on revenue and why no EPS consensus comparison appears anywhere in this model.

Where each case comes from

From cash flow to fair value

Capex outside the verticals

Each vertical's capex is a share of its own revenue, which is the right shape for capacity that scales with sales. These are not that: fixed-size programmes with their own schedule that spend whether or not any segment grows. They are added on top, and they are why free cash flow dips in the years below.

The projected path

The published model's 20 quarters. The horizon and sliders above do not change this table.

Every row is projected. A year-over-year change is shown only where the quarter it compares against exists — an em dash means there is no comparable quarter, not a flat year.

Model revisions

Assumptions are marked to reality as each quarter prints. Every change is appended here, with the fair value the model produced at the time, so the model's own history stays visible.