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AVGO · Forward model · Infrastructure Software · Bear case

What has to happen in Infrastructure Software

Model as of

This page changes Infrastructure Software inside the complete AVGO model. Every other vertical, corporate programme and valuation assumption stays in the selected portfolio case.

AVGO forward model
Horizon
Consolidated fair value $84.81 all other verticals held in this portfolio case
Final-quarter revenue $4.92B 23% of company revenue
Explicit segment contribution $72.62B EBITDA less segment capex, before corporate items

The gigawatt commitments are supply, not orders. Tan's own answer on why $115B is the right number is about deployment: 'even as we ship the chips, are they going to be deployed on a timely basis?' Four of the six XPU customers carry the bulk of the roadmap, so a slip in any one of them removes a leg. This case slows the build, lets content per megawatt drift toward the $20B-per-gigawatt bottom of the disclosed band rather than the $25B midpoint, and assumes VMware renewals start coming back smaller as repriced enterprises finish migrating. Nothing here requires AI spending to stop; it only requires Broadcom's share of it to stop rising.

Infrastructure Software

Basis quarter$8.75B
Final quarter$4.92B
Implied CAGR−11%
Final revenue mix23%

VMware, essentially. A subscription estate being converted from perpetual licences to VMware Cloud Foundation at much higher prices, bolted onto the mainframe and security assets from CA and Symantec. Boring, and the reason Broadcom's cash flow does not swing with the silicon cycle.

Last four quarters
2025 Q4 $6.94B Reported
2026 Q1 $6.80B Reported
2026 Q2 $7.18B Reported
2026 Q3 $8.75B Reported
VMware Cloud Foundation subscriptionsMainframe software (CA)Enterprise security (Symantec, Carbon Black)Legacy perpetual licence and maintenance runoff
Sequential growth −0.6%/qtr decaying toward +2.0% -0.6% into Q4. Management guides infrastructure software to STABILISE at about $8.7B against $8,752M reported.
Infrastructure Software

Latest: $4.92B (2031Q3E)

Period Value
2025Q2 $6.60B
2025Q3 $6.79B
2025Q4 $6.94B
2026Q1 $6.80B
2026Q2 $7.18B
2026Q3 $8.75B
2026Q4E $8.40B
2027Q1E $8.09B
2027Q2E $7.81B
2027Q3E $7.56B
2027Q4E $7.33B
2028Q1E $7.12B
2028Q2E $6.92B
2028Q3E $6.73B
2028Q4E $6.55B
2029Q1E $6.38B
2029Q2E $6.21B
2029Q3E $6.05B
2029Q4E $5.89B
2030Q1E $5.74B
2030Q2E $5.59B
2030Q3E $5.45B
2030Q4E $5.31B
2031Q1E $5.18B
2031Q2E $5.05B
2031Q3E $4.92B

Assumptions & reasoning

  • Every actual here is a reported segment figure, taken straight off the face of the earnings release. Nothing in this vertical's revenue history is estimated or apportioned — what is assumed is the cost side, since Broadcom does not publish segment EBITDA or segment capex.
  • The model does NOT chase the guided quarter, and this is the one place it deliberately falls short. Total 2026 Q3 revenue is guided to roughly $29.4B and AI to $16.0B; with non-AI semiconductors near $4.5B the residual leaves about $8.9B for software, a 24% sequential jump for a business that grew 1% year over year two quarters ago. This line projects 16% instead, landing near $8.3B, and consolidated revenue therefore comes in about 2% under the guide. Treating part of that step as renewal timing rather than run-rate is a judgement call, and it is stated rather than tuned away.
  • The whole growth story is renewal repricing, not new customers. Perpetual VMware licences convert to VCF subscriptions at a large multiple of the old price as each contract comes up, so growth is a function of how much of the estate is still unconverted. That pool is finite, which is why the rate decays to 2% a quarter — roughly 8% a year — rather than holding.
  • 82% EBITDA margin, gliding to 80%, is the highest on this page and it is what makes the mix argument work: as AI margin drifts down, software is the ballast. Broadcom does not disclose segment profitability, so this number is calibrated so the three verticals less 4% central overhead reproduce the consolidated 68.7% Adjusted EBITDA margin actually reported in the basis quarter.
  • The risk here is churn, and it is not visible in a quarterly revenue line until it is large. Repricing an estate at a multiple of the old cost is a strong incentive for enterprises to migrate to a hyperscaler or to a competing hypervisor; departures show up years later as a renewal that does not happen. The Bear case is where that lives.
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