GS · Forward model · Global Banking & Markets · Bear case
What has to happen in Global Banking & Markets
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Global Banking & Markets
Advisory, equity and debt underwriting, FICC and Equities. $15,520M of net revenues in the basis quarter, 76.3% of the firm and 53% above a year earlier. The mix inside it matters more than the total: financing revenues across FICC and Equities were $4.5B, up 62% year on year and 37% of combined FICC and Equities revenue, which is a balance-sheet business constrained by capital rather than a trading business constrained by volatility. Goldman publishes revenue sub-totals for this segment but never pre-tax earnings by sub-line, so it is projected as sequential growth on reported segment revenue and is not split.
Latest: $14.90B (2031Q2E)
| Period | Value |
|---|---|
| 2023Q1 | $8.47B |
| 2023Q2 | $7.18B |
| 2023Q3 | $7.98B |
| 2023Q4 | $6.37B |
| 2024Q1 | $9.73B |
| 2024Q2 | $8.26B |
| 2024Q3 | $8.56B |
| 2024Q4 | $8.51B |
| 2025Q1 | $10.74B |
| 2025Q2 | $10.13B |
| 2025Q3 | $10.17B |
| 2025Q4 | $10.41B |
| 2026Q1 | $12.74B |
| 2026Q2 | $15.52B |
| 2026Q3E | $15.41B |
| 2026Q4E | $15.32B |
| 2027Q1E | $15.24B |
| 2027Q2E | $15.18B |
| 2027Q3E | $15.12B |
| 2027Q4E | $15.08B |
| 2028Q1E | $15.04B |
| 2028Q2E | $15.01B |
| 2028Q3E | $14.99B |
| 2028Q4E | $14.97B |
| 2029Q1E | $14.95B |
| 2029Q2E | $14.94B |
| 2029Q3E | $14.93B |
| 2029Q4E | $14.92B |
| 2030Q1E | $14.91B |
| 2030Q2E | $14.91B |
| 2030Q3E | $14.91B |
| 2030Q4E | $14.90B |
| 2031Q1E | $14.90B |
| 2031Q2E | $14.90B |
Assumptions & reasoning
- A growth driver, not a capacity one. Prime balances, the $188B loan book and the investment-banking backlog are disclosed as levels or as direction, but Goldman publishes no priced volume series the engine could charge a yield on.
- The 48.32% margin is PRE-TAX EARNINGS - $7,499M on $15,520M - already net of $7,946M of segment operating expenses AND of the segment's own $75M provision for credit losses. It is not EBITDA and it is not pre-provision profit: pre-provision would read 48.80% and would take the credit cycle out of the model.
- This segment carries 74% of the firm's $102M provision, on wholesale loans rather than consumer credit. That is a different risk from a card book: lumpy and single-name, not cyclical and diversified. The provision has swung from -$44M to +$248M inside the fourteen quarters.
- Terminal 42.0% gives back 6.3 points. The 2024-25 blended pre-tax margin was 41.95% and the fourteen-quarter blend 41.61%; 48.32% is the highest print in the whole window.
- SEASONALITY TESTED AND REJECTED. Ratio to a centred four-quarter moving average gives [1.1509, 0.9866, 0.9880, 0.8745], signal 0.2764 against a worst window-to-window spread of 0.1182 - a 2.34:1 ratio that PASSES the spread gate. It is rejected on stability instead: ratio-to-year-mean puts Q4 at 0.9415 rather than 0.8745, the per-year Q4 ratios are 0.850, 0.970 and 1.005 so the weakness is disappearing rather than repeating, raw Q4-versus-Q3 was -20.2%, -0.7% and +2.4%, and the 2025 Q4 window reaches into the accelerating 2026 quarters. Applying the factors anyway prints $1,061.03 against $1,049.13, so the decision is worth 1.1%.