BE · Forward model · Product — Energy Servers · AI sliver case
What has to happen in Product — Energy Servers
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Product — Energy Servers
The engine, and 88% of the basis quarter. Bloom sells solid-oxide fuel cell modules to whoever pays for the box — increasingly a financier, utility or strategic partner rather than the end user, who is buying power. What caps this line is not orders: management says every major US hyperscaler and a dozen-plus neoclouds, AI labs and colocation operators have validated the product, and that capacity is not the constraint. What caps it is how fast megawatts get built, shipped and accepted against customer site-ready dates. So the projection is a deployment schedule — quarterly deliverable megawatts, the share actually converted, and what a megawatt sells for — not a demand forecast.
Latest: $1.45B (2031Q2E)
| Period | Value |
|---|---|
| 2023Q1 | $194M |
| 2023Q2 | $215M |
| 2023Q3 | $305M |
| 2023Q4 | $262M |
| 2024Q1 | $153M |
| 2024Q2 | $226M |
| 2024Q3 | $234M |
| 2024Q4 | $472M |
| 2025Q1 | $212M |
| 2025Q2 | $297M |
| 2025Q3 | $384M |
| 2025Q4 | $638M |
| 2026Q1 | $653M |
| 2026Q2 | $935M |
| 2026Q3E | $982M |
| 2026Q4E | $1.03B |
| 2027Q1E | $1.07B |
| 2027Q2E | $1.10B |
| 2027Q3E | $1.14B |
| 2027Q4E | $1.17B |
| 2028Q1E | $1.21B |
| 2028Q2E | $1.24B |
| 2028Q3E | $1.26B |
| 2028Q4E | $1.29B |
| 2029Q1E | $1.31B |
| 2029Q2E | $1.33B |
| 2029Q3E | $1.35B |
| 2029Q4E | $1.37B |
| 2030Q1E | $1.39B |
| 2030Q2E | $1.40B |
| 2030Q3E | $1.41B |
| 2030Q4E | $1.43B |
| 2031Q1E | $1.44B |
| 2031Q2E | $1.45B |
Assumptions & reasoning
- Product gross margin has run 33-37% for two years with no trend break, so margin is not what decides this line - the megawatt cadence is. Q2'26 36.50% against a 35.76% trailing-twelve-month figure.
- Megawatt volumes here are back-solved from an assumed price, not disclosed. At $3.0M/MW the implied quarterly deployment runs 128, 213, 218 and 312 MW across the last four quarters - a coherent ramp, but arithmetic on an assumption.
- The Oracle warrant is a contra-revenue item, not a cost. Its $324.4M aggregate fair value is 'recognized as a reduction of revenue as the underlying Energy Server systems sold under the Oracle arrangement are delivered'; $306.5M of it still sits on the balance sheet as a customer consideration asset ($91.0M current, $215.5M non-current) and will reduce reported product revenue on the Oracle 1.2 GW as it ships.
- Bloom's own definition of product backlog 'includes both expected Bloom product revenue and reflects anticipated ITC and other tax incentives', so a per-MW figure quoted off backlog is a system value, not recognised revenue per MW. The two are different units.
- The 5 GW figure is not current capacity. The 10-K says the Fremont building 'can accommodate additional capacity expansion of up to approximately 5 gigawatts' at 'approximately six to nine months to install and capital expenditure of approximately $100 million to $150 million' per incremental gigawatt. The committed, funded target is 2 GW by end-2026.
- No calendar seasonality is applied. The apparent fourth-quarter concentration is dominated by large-campus delivery windows and the current capacity ramp; applying a Q4 factor would double-count those effects already carried by the megawatt driver.