KLAR · Forward model · Bull case
The Bull case, 20 quarters out
Each segment is projected from its own operating driver, rolled up into consolidated cash flow, and discounted back to a fair value per share. The assumptions below are editable — change them and every number on this page moves with them.
WHAT IS DISCLOSED AND WHAT IS NOT. Klarna states under IFRS 8 that it 'operates as one operating segment and has one reportable segment'. The US / Global ex-US split used here is the company's own supplementary management disclosure, published quarterly in the SEC-filed EX-99.5 for ten quarters (2024 Q1 to 2026 Q2), and the US revenue figure is corroborated to the dollar by the IFRS geographic note ($376m in both). Every actual in both verticals is a DIRECTLY REPORTED figure - none is estimated, apportioned or derived. Disclosed by region: GMV, revenue, each transaction-cost line and transaction margin dollars. NOT disclosed by region and therefore NOT split: operating expenses, depreciation, share-based payments, other income, tax, net income and non-controlling interests. The model puts the regional transaction margin inside the verticals and the ENTIRE non-transaction cost base into corporate overhead. Nothing below the transaction margin is apportioned to a region, and no split Klarna does not publish has been invented. THE LABELS ARE WRONG AND THE PAGE CANNOT CHANGE THEM. This is an EQUITY-level DCF. Where the page says 'Enterprise value' it means equity value; where it says 'Net cash' it means a deliberate zero. $11.7bn of consumer deposits fund 88% of the funding base and $1.7bn of notes payable sit alongside them; those are funding at a licensed EEA bank, not financing to be netted against the $2.7bn of cash and $2.6bn of debt securities held as the liquidity buffer. Same convention as BAC, GS and JPM here. A DISCONTINUITY BETWEEN HISTORY AND PROJECTION, ON PURPOSE. From H2 2026 Klarna moves US and German Fair Financing to fair value through profit or loss, which cuts reported revenue AND reported transaction costs each by about 10bp of GMV. Prior periods are NOT restated. The reported FY2026 take rate is guided at 2.74-2.75% against a comparable 2.84-2.85%, and the guidance table prints the ratio twice precisely because the two are not comparable. The unit prices and margins in this spec are on the POST-change reported basis (the disclosed pre-change ratios divided or multiplied by 0.9323), so that the projection is comparable with guidance; the ten quarters of actuals are left exactly as reported, on the pre-change basis. Transaction margin DOLLARS and pre-tax profit are identical on either basis - only the ratios move - but a reader comparing the 2026 Q2 actual of $1,042m with the modelled 2026 Q3 of $969m is looking at a 7% guided decline plus a roughly 3% presentation change, not a 10% collapse. THE ONE PLACE THE MODEL DISAGREES WITH GUIDANCE, STATED HERE RATHER THAN LEFT TO BE FOUND. The model's Q3 2026 transaction margin dollars are $447m against a guided $340-360m - 24% above the top of the range. It is deliberate. The model starts from the DELIVERED basis-quarter regional margins because those are what Klarna discloses by region; the guided Q3 trough is not published by region, and haircutting both verticals uniformly to reach $350m would break the calibration gate and substitute a modelled ratio for a disclosed one. Klarna's own quarterly guides also run conservative: it guided Q2 2026 TMD at $375-395m and delivered $446m, and guided adjusted operating income at $30-50m and delivered $91m. And Q3 is a disclosed one-quarter investment trough carrying 'the highest level of share-based payments in 2026', not a level - the FY guide implies Q4 2026 TMD back near $450m. The engine cannot seasonalise a margin, so it cannot reproduce a one-quarter dip. Guidance-implied Q3 pre-tax profit is about -$59m (adjusted operating income midpoint $10m less roughly $23m of D&A and roughly $45m of share-based payments); the model prints $29m. That $88m gap is one quarter of twenty. NON-CONTROLLING INTERESTS ARE A REAL LEAK. The engine has no NCI concept, so its free cash flow lands on TOTAL net profit ($9m in the basis quarter), not on the $4m attributable to shareholders of Klarna Group plc. Over H1 2026 non-controlling interests took $11m while attributable profit was NEGATIVE $1m - more than the whole of the group's profit. The mitigating fact is that these are Employee Equity Program interests in Klarna subsidiaries whose instruments exchange into Klarna Group plc ordinary shares (1,948,166 were exchanged in April 2025 alone), so they are better read as future dilution of a flat share count than as a permanent third-party claim. Calibrating to attributable profit instead would require an 85.2% 'tax' rate, which is not a tax rate. SHARE COUNT: 379,160,066 PERIOD-END BASIC, and it points the OPPOSITE way from GS and BAC. Those two shrink their counts through buybacks, so a flat count understates their terminal EPS. Klarna has NO buyback authorisation and NO dividend - it retains everything to fund loan growth - and its count GROWS: 1,652,156 ordinary shares were issued in the six months to June 2026 on 377,507,910 at the start of the year, about 0.88% a year, through RSU vesting, subsidiary share exchanges and the Employee Equity Program. Held over twenty quarters that is roughly 4.5% of dilution the model does not carry: terminal EPS of $0.380 on a flat count becomes $0.364, and the $4.45 base fair value becomes $4.26. The DILUTED alternative is immaterial here, unlike GS where it flipped the headline sign: weighted-average diluted shares of 378,889,915 are 0.07% BELOW the period-end basic count and would move fair value from $4.4507 to $4.4539. The 27.1m warrants and options at a $60.6 weighted-average exercise price and 20.4m Class C options at $42.0 are all deeply out of the money at $14.20 and are correctly excluded. CAPITAL IS NOT THE BINDING CONSTRAINT AND NO BUFFER IS BEING SPENT DOWN - the opposite of Goldman. CET1 ROSE from 15.1% to 17.4% over twelve months against a 12.5% overall capital requirement, while total risk exposure FELL from SEK 92,654m to SEK 84,787m over six, helped by receivable offloading and, after the period, a $518m significant risk transfer completed on 16 July 2026. Surplus CET1 is about SEK 4,155m, roughly $428m. The leverage ratio at 9.6% against a 3.0% requirement binds far less, and the liquidity coverage ratio is 970.7%. So the BAC and GS payout question does not arise at all: the honest statement is not 'earnings are distributable' but 'there are barely any earnings yet, and every dollar is retained'. These ratios are disclosed in SEK on what the EU KM1 template indicates is the Swedish regulated bank's consolidated situation, while the group reports in USD; they are context, not model inputs. NO CASH-FLOW SIGNAL EXISTS FOR THIS COMPANY. Klarna's own release warns that operating cash flow 'primarily represent[s] the net flows of money coming in and going out from the bank's consumer lending and retail deposit activities' and 'is not a reflection of the bank's net operating result for the period'. Reported free cash flow was -$269m in a quarter the company earned $9m, and -$3,046m in 2025 Q4, because deposits fell $1.3bn over the half. Any R40 score computed from Klarna's reported cash flow is a deposit gauge. The free cash flow on this page is an earnings construct, calibrated to net profit, and does not equal the reported line. THE PRICERUNNER JUDGMENT IS NOT IN THIS MODEL, and it is 39% of the market capitalisation. A first-instance Stockholm Patent and Market Court decision on 1 July 2026 ordered Google to pay Klarna's subsidiary approximately $2.1bn in damages and accrued interest. Both parties appealed on 22 July 2026, the claim is financed under a third-party litigation-funding arrangement, any recovery 'would be reduced by' payments to litigation funders, ATE insurers and PriceRunner's former shareholders and by taxation, Klarna publishes no net-to-Klarna figure, and 'the criteria for recognition had not been met'. There is no honest way to size it with this engine's levers, so it is excluded from netCash and from every scenario and recorded here as an unmodelled contingent asset. CURRENCY IS ON ONE BASIS THROUGHOUT. Klarna reports IFRS in US DOLLARS and its NYSE ordinary shares trade in US dollars, so spec.currency is USD and no exchange rate touches this model - unlike Nokia, which is modelled in euros against a dollar ADS quote. The $14.20 reference price is the 28 August 2026 close carried in data/companies/klar/profile.json; KLAR is not yet in data/prices-close.json, so the render layer has no live quote to substitute and falls back to this price. SEASONALITY. Both verticals carry factors derived by ratio to a CENTRED four-quarter moving average of their own disclosed revenue, normalised to mean 1.0, with the basis quarter deseasonalised before the driver runs - which is why the 'units' inputs are $8,233.6m and $28,491.3m rather than the disclosed $7,887m and $28,762m of GMV. The US line passes the signal-to-spread test decisively (9.37:1 in Q3, 4.20:1 in Q4). The Global ex-US line does NOT pass comfortably: 1.59:1 in Q3 and 1.99:1 in Q4 with two Q4 windows that trend, which is the shape for which Goldman's Global Banking & Markets seasonality was rejected here. It is applied anyway, for the reasons in that vertical's notes, and the cost of the call is visible: leaving it aseasonal leaves the base fair value unchanged at $4.45 and only flattens the modelled Q4 2026 lift from 9.8% to 6.4% sequentially, against a guidance-implied Q4 about 15% above Q3. TWO AND A HALF YEARS OF HISTORY, FIVE YEARS OF PROJECTION. Klarna has filed one 20-F and four quarterly 6-Ks. The ten quarters used here exist only because it republishes pre-IPO periods in a supplementary exhibit, and there is no pre-2024 comparable line-item history in any filed document. Seasonality rests on six centred windows and two of the four factors per vertical rest on a single window each. This is the model's largest structural weakness and no better input fixes it.
The operating leverage lands AND the effective tax rate normalises. marginDelta +8.0 points on both verticals, which is arithmetically identical to the non-transaction cost ratio falling from 43.13% to 35.13% of revenue, plus an exit of 17x P/E grossed at a normalised 30% rate = 11.90x. Result: $16.24 a share, +14.4%, an implied 4.30x tangible book - which is the honest reading of this model: the market is already paying for most of the bull case. What it does NOT reach is management's stated 25% adjusted-operating-income target. Note that a scenario marginDelta lifts quarter one too, so bull-case Q3 2026 runs well above the guided $5-15m of adjusted operating income.
Latest: $1.22B (2031Q2E)
| Period | Value |
|---|---|
| 2024Q1 | $642M |
| 2024Q2 | $682M |
| 2024Q3 | $706M |
| 2024Q4 | $782M |
| 2025Q1 | $701M |
| 2025Q2 | $823M |
| 2025Q3 | $903M |
| 2025Q4 | $1.08B |
| 2026Q1 | $1.01B |
| 2026Q2 | $1.04B |
| 2026Q3E | $969M |
| 2026Q4E | $1.06B |
| 2027Q1E | $889M |
| 2027Q2E | $970M |
| 2027Q3E | $990M |
| 2027Q4E | $1.10B |
| 2028Q1E | $930M |
| 2028Q2E | $1.02B |
| 2028Q3E | $1.04B |
| 2028Q4E | $1.17B |
| 2029Q1E | $986M |
| 2029Q2E | $1.08B |
| 2029Q3E | $1.11B |
| 2029Q4E | $1.24B |
| 2030Q1E | $1.05B |
| 2030Q2E | $1.15B |
| 2030Q3E | $1.18B |
| 2030Q4E | $1.32B |
| 2031Q1E | $1.11B |
| 2031Q2E | $1.22B |
What drives each segment
United States
Units × priceThe margin story, not the volume story. US GMV grew 27% year on year to $7,887m and US revenue 37% to $376m, but the point is the transaction margin: 23.4% of revenue against 14% a year earlier, against a Global ex-US book at 53.8% and 'most established markets' at approximately 60%. The US take rate is already the highest in the group at 4.77% of GMV, roughly double the ex-US 2.32%, because the US mix is weighted to Fair Financing, which carries interest income and books provisions upfront. Nearly all of this model's value comes from closing that margin gap, not from US volume. Revenue is projected as GMV multiplied by a take rate because both are disclosed every quarter; active consumers and ARPAC are group-only and cannot constrain a regional line.
Latest: $507M (2031Q2E)
| Period | Value |
|---|---|
| 2024Q1 | $179M |
| 2024Q2 | $200M |
| 2024Q3 | $210M |
| 2024Q4 | $261M |
| 2025Q1 | $238M |
| 2025Q2 | $275M |
| 2025Q3 | $317M |
| 2025Q4 | $413M |
| 2026Q1 | $399M |
| 2026Q2 | $376M |
| 2026Q3E | $363M |
| 2026Q4E | $433M |
| 2027Q1E | $362M |
| 2027Q2E | $379M |
| 2027Q3E | $392M |
| 2027Q4E | $467M |
| 2028Q1E | $390M |
| 2028Q2E | $408M |
| 2028Q3E | $422M |
| 2028Q4E | $503M |
| 2029Q1E | $420M |
| 2029Q2E | $439M |
| 2029Q3E | $454M |
| 2029Q4E | $541M |
| 2030Q1E | $451M |
| 2030Q2E | $472M |
| 2030Q3E | $488M |
| 2030Q4E | $581M |
| 2031Q1E | $485M |
| 2031Q2E | $507M |
Assumptions & reasoning
- The 'EBITDA margin' here is the DISCLOSED US transaction margin - $88m of transaction margin dollars on $376m of revenue, 23.40% - and it is already NET OF CREDIT: $105m of US provision for credit losses and $63m of US funding costs are inside it. Consumer credit sits where Klarna's own disclosure puts it, not in a separate line. The 25.10% entered is that 23.40% divided by 0.9323, which puts it on the post-fair-value reported basis the driver runs on; the dollars are identical either way.
- The 23.4% margin in the basis quarter was 'modestly below the first quarter as we completed a back book receivable sale in Q1 that we did not repeat' - so the 26.6% printed in 2026 Q1 was the outlier, not this quarter's 23.4%.
- US GMV is 22% of group GMV but US revenue is 36% of group revenue, because the US take rate is roughly double the ex-US one. The US is a mix story before it is a growth story, and the Fair Financing weighting that produces the high take rate is also what produces the low margin.
- SEASONALITY APPLIED, factors [0.9325, 0.9579, 0.9721, 1.1376] by ratio to a CENTRED four-quarter moving average of this line's own disclosed revenue. Q3 signal 0.0279 against a window-to-window spread of 0.0030, a 9.37:1 ratio; Q4 signal 0.1376 against a 0.0328 spread, 4.20:1 - well above the 2.34:1 at which Goldman's GBM was rejected in this repository. Ten quarters give six centred windows, so Q1 and Q2 rest on ONE window each and are corroborated instead by three other facts: US GMV fell sequentially in both Q4-to-Q1 transitions (-14.8% and -16.8%) against 27-43% year-on-year growth, GMV-derived factors give the same shape ([0.8961, 0.9889, 0.9575, 1.1576]), and management guides Q4 2026 to be 'our strongest transaction margin quarter of the year'.
- The factors are fitted to REVENUE, which is the object the engine multiplies, and are then used to deseasonalise GMV into 'units'. The units trace is therefore GMV deseasonalised by a revenue factor and equals literal reported GMV only in the basis quarter. Take-rate seasonality is left inside the factors rather than in the price drift; it is small, the US take rate ranging 4.31-4.52% across 2024 with no repeat of that pattern in 2025.
- The fair-value presentation change from H2 2026 names 'our US and German Fair Financing'. Klarna does not publish how the roughly 10bp of GMV effect splits between the two, so the SAME 0.9323 revenue factor and 1/0.9323 margin re-basing is applied to both verticals. A Fair-Financing-weighted allocation would put about 69% of it in the US; Germany's share of the ex-US Fair Financing book is not disclosed, so that allocation cannot be built without inventing it. The group total and pre-tax profit are unaffected by the choice.
- capexIntensity is EXACTLY ZERO and it is not laziness. Depreciation of $12m a quarter is already deducted inside the transaction margin and again inside the group overhead ratio, and Klarna's cash capex is $8m a quarter for the WHOLE company - below its own depreciation. Any positive intensity would double-count.
- Klarna does not disclose operating expenses by region, so US profitability below the transaction margin cannot be observed at all. This vertical's margin is a CONTRIBUTION margin, not a segment profit margin; every dollar of operating cost sits in corporate overhead.
Global (Ex-US)
Units × priceThe cash engine and the problem child at once: 78% of group GMV, 64% of revenue and 80% of transaction margin dollars, running at a 53.8% transaction margin that management says is approaching the roughly 60% of its most established markets. It is also where the guidance cut came from. Germany is Klarna's largest market by volume, German retail sales 'grew less than 1% in real terms in the first half', and the revised guide 'simply assumes Germany stays softer rather than recovering'. Projected the same way as the US line - disclosed GMV multiplied by a disclosed take rate - because Germany, the UK and 'other countries' appear in the IFRS geographic note for REVENUE ONLY, with no GMV, no costs and no margin, so they cannot become verticals of their own.
Latest: $711M (2031Q2E)
| Period | Value |
|---|---|
| 2024Q1 | $463M |
| 2024Q2 | $482M |
| 2024Q3 | $496M |
| 2024Q4 | $521M |
| 2025Q1 | $463M |
| 2025Q2 | $548M |
| 2025Q3 | $586M |
| 2025Q4 | $669M |
| 2026Q1 | $613M |
| 2026Q2 | $666M |
| 2026Q3E | $606M |
| 2026Q4E | $631M |
| 2027Q1E | $527M |
| 2027Q2E | $591M |
| 2027Q3E | $598M |
| 2027Q4E | $636M |
| 2028Q1E | $540M |
| 2028Q2E | $611M |
| 2028Q3E | $622M |
| 2028Q4E | $665M |
| 2029Q1E | $566M |
| 2029Q2E | $642M |
| 2029Q3E | $654M |
| 2029Q4E | $700M |
| 2030Q1E | $595M |
| 2030Q2E | $675M |
| 2030Q3E | $688M |
| 2030Q4E | $736M |
| 2031Q1E | $627M |
| 2031Q2E | $711M |
Assumptions & reasoning
- The 'EBITDA margin' is the DISCLOSED ex-US transaction margin - $358m on $666m of revenue, 53.75% - net of $87m of ex-US credit provisions and $108m of ex-US funding costs. The 57.65% entered is 53.75% divided by 0.9323, putting it on the post-fair-value reported basis the driver runs on. The basis quarter was helped by a back-book sale and by the German forward-flow programme launched in the quarter, both called out by management.
- Germany is the largest ex-US market by volume and $240m of the $666m of ex-US revenue in the basis quarter, 36%, from the IFRS geographic note. The UK is $120m and 'other countries' $306m, with no single country above 10% of group revenue. None of these can become verticals: only revenue is disclosed for them.
- SEASONALITY APPLIED, AND THIS IS THE MOST ARGUABLE CALL IN THE MODEL. Factors [0.9018, 1.0095, 1.0158, 1.0730] by ratio to a centred four-quarter moving average. Q3 signal 0.0158 against a 0.0099 spread is 1.59:1; Q4 signal 0.0730 against a 0.0366 spread is 1.99:1 AND the two Q4 windows TREND (1.0446 then 1.0812) - the exact shape for which Goldman's GBM seasonality was rejected here at 2.34:1. It is applied anyway because ex-US GMV fell 13.6% and 11.8% in the two Q4-to-Q1 transitions against 21-32% year-on-year growth, a two-for-two repeat a ten-quarter centred window cannot measure; because GMV-derived factors agree ([0.8815, 1.0270, 1.0042, 1.0873]); and because the FY guide implies a Q4 about 15% above Q3, which the model cannot approach if the line carrying 64% of revenue is flat. Left aseasonal, the group Q4 lift falls from about 9.5% to about 5%.
- Klarna states that provisions are seasonal - the Q1 2026 release said 'We expect our provision to rise in 2Q-4Q, solely reflecting the seasonality.' The engine does not seasonalise margins, so this line's transaction margin is a mid-year average and will run above the true Q3 and below the true Q1. The annual total is unaffected; the quarterly shape of the margin is smoother than reality.
- This is twenty-plus countries at very different maturities aggregated into one line. Sweden at roughly 60% transaction margin and a newly launched Southern European market are averaged together, and Klarna publishes nothing that would let the model separate them. The terminal 62% on the reported basis is 57.8% on the comparable pre-change basis, still short of the roughly 60% the release attributes to established markets today.
- capexIntensity is EXACTLY ZERO for the same reason as the US line: depreciation already sits inside the transaction margin and inside the overhead ratio, and group cash capex of $8m a quarter is below group depreciation of $12m.
Where each case comes from
Management target case — primary sources
The primary sources this case is built from — filings, calls and posts. Where they are claims by an interested party rather than disclosures, every number in the Management target column is what happens if they are taken at face value.
Klarna second quarter 2026 results, 18 August 2026
- Aug 18, 2026 And we have a long-term target of a 50% transaction margin dollars and 25% adjusted operating income. So we will continue to move towards that direction, but we won't put a particular quarter to it.
- Aug 18, 2026 Full-year adjusted operating income is expected to be $280-300 million, at 6.9-7.2% of revenue, more than four times the $65 million delivered in the whole of 2025.
From cash flow to fair value
| Present value of free cash flow, 20 quarters | $751M |
| Terminal-year revenue | $4.82B |
| Terminal-year EBITDA | $819M |
| Exit multiple, on ebitda | 11.9x |
| Terminal value | $9.74B |
| Discounted at 12.5% a year, terminal value becomes | $5.41B |
| Enterprise value | $6.16B |
| Net cash | $0 |
| Equity value | $6.16B |
| Shares | 0.38B |
| Fair value per share | $16.24 |
| Against the current price of $14.20 | +14% |
THIS IS AN EQUITY DCF WEARING AN ENTERPRISE ENGINE'S LABELS. The page says 'Enterprise value' and 'Net cash'; it means EQUITY VALUE and a deliberate zero, exactly as BAC, GS and JPM are built here. Six substitutions make that reading correct and all six are checked against the June quarter. (1) The verticals are Klarna's own regional revenue disclosure, which sums to reported total revenue in all ten quarters within $1m of rounding. (2) 'EBITDA margin' is the disclosed regional TRANSACTION MARGIN, already net of that region's provision for credit losses and funding costs - $105m and $63m in the US, $87m and $108m ex-US - so consumer credit is inside the margin, not hidden. (3) corporate.overheadPctRevenue of 43.13% carries the ENTIRE non-transaction cost base including $38m of share-based payments and $4m of restructuring, so the engine's EBITDA is IFRS PROFIT BEFORE TAX and not adjusted operating income. (4) capexIntensity is EXACTLY ZERO: depreciation is already deducted inside the pre-tax margin and cash capex of $8m a quarter is below depreciation of $12m, so a positive intensity would double-count. (5) corporate.taxRate is the disclosed 66.7% effective rate, which lands free cash flow on net profit. (6) netCash is a deliberate ZERO because $11.7bn of consumer deposits and $1.7bn of notes payable are FUNDING at a licensed bank, not financing; netting them against $2.7bn of cash and $2.6bn of debt securities would print a false, deeply negative equity. THE CALIBRATION GATE. Substituting the basis quarter's DISCLOSED revenue into these ratios gives transaction margin dollars of $445.96m against a reported $446m, pre-tax profit of $26.97m against a reported $27m, and free cash flow of $8.98m against a reported net profit of $9.00m - a -0.21% error, against -0.05% for BAC and -0.43% for GS. The identical gate holds on the post-fair-value reported basis the spec actually runs on, because both sides are re-based by the same 0.9323: revenue $971.5m, margins 25.10% and 57.65%, overhead 43.13%, pre-tax $26.95m, free cash flow $8.98m, -0.27%. The dollars never move; only the ratios do. The FIRST PROJECTED QUARTER prints $9.7m of free cash flow against $9.0m of reported net profit, +7.8%, and the whole of that difference is one quarter of driver growth and one step of margin glide. THE DISCOUNT RATE IS A COST OF EQUITY, AND THE BANK P/TBV INVERSION USED FOR BAC AND GS CANNOT BE USED HERE. Inverting P/TBV = (ROTCE - g)/(CoE - g) on Klarna's observables - a 3.760x tape multiple ($14.20 over $3.7768 of tangible book) against an annualised ROTE of 1.12% - returns a cost of equity BELOW the growth rate: at g = 3% it solves to about 2.4%. That is not a defect in the arithmetic, it is the arithmetic saying Klarna is not valued on book. So 12.5% is set from the ladder already in this repository - Visa and Mastercard 9.0%, PayPal 9.5%, JPMorgan and BAC 10.0%, Goldman 10.5%, Block and Grab 11.0%, Affirm and Coinbase 12.0%, Upstart 13.0% - above Affirm and below Upstart, because Klarna carries a consumer credit book, is eleven months listed with two profitable quarters, is a $5.4bn company trading 64% below its IPO price, has its largest market by volume in a consumer recession, and translates EUR, SEK and GBP earnings into a USD reporting currency. No CAPM cross-check was available. The rate is not what carries the answer: 10.5% prints $4.83 and 15.0% prints $4.02, against $4.45 at 12.5%, because 80.5% of the value is terminal. THE EXIT IS A P/E GROSSED DOWN BY TAX, and the arithmetic matters because the engine applies the multiple to terminal-year 'EBITDA', which in this model is PRE-TAX profit: 17 x (1 - 0.667) = 5.661x on pre-tax, entered as 5.66. Entering 17 would have inflated the terminal - 80.5% of total value - by 200%. The 17x is an assumed forward multiple for a mature, mid-single-digit-growth payments-and-lending network in 2031. It is the most sensitive input by a distance: 12x prints $3.40, 20x prints $5.08, 25x prints $6.14. Grossing at the disclosed 66.7% keeps the terminal on exactly the same basis as the explicit period, following BAC and GS; grossing at a normalised 30% instead gives 11.90x and $8.40 a share, and that variant is carried as the BULL CASE rather than smuggled into the base, so the base contains no assumption about a tax rate Klarna has never reported. THREE CROSS-CHECKS, AND THEY DO NOT AGREE - WHICH IS THE POINT. The DCF prints $4.45 a share, an implied 1.178x tangible book and 0.691x book, against a tape of 3.760x and 2.206x. Under P/TBV = (ROTE - g)/(CoE - g) at a 12.5% cost of equity and 3% growth, 1.178x corresponds to a sustainable ROTE of 14.2%, which a profitable consumer-payments bank can plausibly earn; the tape's 3.760x corresponds to 38.7%, which no consumer lender sustains through a cycle. Delivered ROTE was 1.12% annualised in the basis quarter, about zero over H1 2026 and negative over the trailing twelve months. The gap between $4.45 and $14.20 is therefore not a rounding argument: the market is pricing an operating-leverage and tax outcome this model deliberately refuses to assume. Every point off the 43.13% overhead ratio is worth about $0.54 a share - 40% gives $6.14, 38% $7.22, 35% $8.83, 33% $9.91 - and a normalised tax rate is worth as much again: 40% gives $8.02, 30% $9.36, 25% $10.03. Two levers the model holds flat, each worth roughly a doubling on its own, are the entire disagreement.
Read the other way round: at $14.20 the market is paying 10.2x terminal-year revenue, holding every other assumption on this page fixed. That is the number to argue about.
The projected path
| Quarter | United States | Global (Ex-US) | Revenue | YoY | EBITDA | Capex | FCF | R40 | PV of FCF |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 Q3E | $363M | $606M | $969M | +7% | $107M | $0 | $36M | +11 | $34M |
| 2026 Q4E | $433M | $631M | $1.06B | -2% | $113M | $0 | $38M | +2 | $36M |
| 2027 Q1E | $362M | $527M | $889M | -12% | $100M | $0 | $33M | -8 | $31M |
| 2027 Q2E | $379M | $591M | $970M | -7% | $120M | $0 | $40M | -3 | $35M |
| 2027 Q3E | $392M | $598M | $990M | +2% | $126M | $0 | $42M | +6 | $36M |
| 2027 Q4E | $467M | $636M | $1.10B | +4% | $138M | $0 | $46M | +8 | $39M |
| 2028 Q1E | $390M | $540M | $930M | +5% | $122M | $0 | $41M | +9 | $33M |
| 2028 Q2E | $408M | $611M | $1.02B | +5% | $144M | $0 | $48M | +10 | $38M |
| 2028 Q3E | $422M | $622M | $1.04B | +6% | $151M | $0 | $50M | +10 | $38M |
| 2028 Q4E | $503M | $665M | $1.17B | +6% | $166M | $0 | $55M | +11 | $41M |
| 2029 Q1E | $420M | $566M | $986M | +6% | $145M | $0 | $48M | +11 | $35M |
| 2029 Q2E | $439M | $642M | $1.08B | +6% | $168M | $0 | $56M | +11 | $39M |
| 2029 Q3E | $454M | $654M | $1.11B | +6% | $175M | $0 | $58M | +11 | $40M |
| 2029 Q4E | $541M | $700M | $1.24B | +6% | $193M | $0 | $64M | +11 | $42M |
| 2030 Q1E | $451M | $595M | $1.05B | +6% | $167M | $0 | $56M | +12 | $36M |
| 2030 Q2E | $472M | $675M | $1.15B | +6% | $191M | $0 | $64M | +12 | $40M |
| 2030 Q3E | $488M | $688M | $1.18B | +6% | $198M | $0 | $66M | +12 | $40M |
| 2030 Q4E | $581M | $736M | $1.32B | +6% | $218M | $0 | $73M | +12 | $43M |
| 2031 Q1E | $485M | $627M | $1.11B | +6% | $188M | $0 | $63M | +12 | $36M |
| 2031 Q2E | $507M | $711M | $1.22B | +6% | $214M | $0 | $71M | +12 | $39M |
Every row is projected. A year-over-year change is shown only where the quarter it compares against exists — an em dash means there is no comparable quarter, not a flat year.
Model revisions
Assumptions are marked to reality as each quarter prints. Every change is appended here, with the fair value the model produced at the time, so the model's own history stays visible.
| Date | Changed | Fair value then | Note |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-29 | all | $4.45 | First publication, on the 2026 Q2 result filed 18 August 2026. Built as an EQUITY-level DCF on Klarna's own regional revenue disclosure, with the disclosed transaction margins as the vertical margins, the entire non-transaction cost base as corporate overhead and the disclosed 66.7% effective tax rate, so that free cash flow lands on reported net profit. |